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IN THE· SUPREM.E CQU,RT 
of the 
STATE OF U'TAH 
HAR\TEY TH011:PSON, 
Plaintiff -Appellant, 
-vs.-
FORD ~10TOR c·OMP ANY, 
Defendant-Respondent 
Case No. 10024 
RE.SPONDENT'S S·UPP·LEMENTAL BRIEF 
S.TAT·E.MENT OF KIND OF CASE 
·This is a suit by plaintiff for personal injuries sus-
tained by him in attempting to stop a garbage truck 
which was rolling down a steep grade, allegedly as a 
result of the failure of the parking brake. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER CO,URT 
The trial judge granted a sumrnary judgment in 
favor of defendant Ford Motor Cornpany and against 
the plaintiff, no cause of action, on the grounds that it 
appeared from plaintiff's own testimony that he was 
guilty of contributory negligence as a rnatter of law in 
violating Section 41-6-105, U.C.A. 1953. 
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RE.LIEF SOUGH·T ON APPE:AL 
Defendant-respondent seeks an affirn1ance of the 
judgment below. 
This is the second time that this case has been be-
fore the court. On the original appeal, Case No. 9807, a 
summary judgment in favor of defendant and respondent 
Ford Motor c·ompany was reversed for the reason that 
depositions, relied upon by defendant to support the 
order granting the summary judgment, had not been 
opened or published. ~This court specifically refrained 
from considering or ruling upon the merits of the case. 
Following remittitur to the District Court, an order 
was made opening and publishing all depositions which 
had been taken in the case. (R. 9). Subsequently defend-
ant filed a renewal of its motion for summary judgment, 
which was argued before Judge F:aux, and after being 
taken under advisement was again granted. (R. 10, 11-
12). The parties have stipulated that the briefs served 
and filed in case No. 9807 may be refiled in support of 
their respective positions in the present case, since the 
issues are identical. ·The parties have further stipulated, 
and this court has ordered, that either side may file 
supplemental briefs in order to present to the court any 
new material which 1nay be helpful in assisting the court 
to a detern1ination of the issues. 
In view of the caveat contained in the opinion in case 
N 0 . 9807, we felt that it would be advisable, and of as sis-
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tance to the court, to elaborate upon the facts, which are 
entirely without dispute, upon which Judge Faux relied 
in making his ruling. 
Plaintiff had had eight years experience working 
in the Street Department as a garbage collector. He was 
familiar with the use of garbage trucks, and with the 
use of air brakes. (Plaintiff's deposition, p. 3). He had 
worked "the avenues" for a long time before the date of 
the accident. (Plaintiff's deposition, p. 4). According 
to his fello\v worker Jensen, plaintiff and Jensen had 
worked for five to six years together on "the avenues." 
(Jensen's deposiiton, p. 18). The hill where the accident 
occurred "\Vas "a pretty steep hill." (Jensen's deposition, 
p. 18). 
There was nothing strange or unusual about the 
operation of this truck. (Plaintiff's deposition, p. 2!6·). 
Plaintiff had had previous experience with this type of 
equipment. (Plaintiff's deposition, pp. 40, 44). 
Both plaintiff and his co-"\vorker, Jensen, were fully 
familiar with the dangers of a runaway on a steep hill. 
Both had had that experience, and the possibility was a 
source of conversation and kidding among the garbage 
collectors. (Plaintiff's desposition, p .. 37; Jensen's depo-
sition, pp. 8-9'). 
According to plaintiff's own testimony, the truck was 
stopped eight feet from the curb, pointed in a south-
westerly direction. (Plaintiff's deposition, pp. 10, 23). 
(See also Jensen's deposition, p. 11). Plaintiff's own 
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version of the accident is set forth in following excerpts 
from his testimony. 
"Q. Now, were you in the middle of the 
street or on the right-hand side or left-hand side o? 
A. We was on the left-hand side. 
Q. What way were the wheels pointed, if you 
know~ 
A. Kind of an angle like this. (Indicating) 
Q. 1The street goes straight south, does it 
not~ 
A. Straight south, and I was kind of parked 
on an angle like this. (Indicating) 
Q. Now, you are showing me your wheels 
were turned somewhat toward the southwest? 
A. Well, yes, a little. 
Q. Was the truck pointing right up and 
down the street or was it angled a little toward the 
southwest? 
A. It was angled." (Emphasis ours.) (Plain-
tiff's deposition, p. 10). 
"Q. Now, tell us what you did first after you 
got out of the truck; where did you walk~ 
A. To the back. 
Q. Now, you didn't walk over to the curb to 
get some garbage~ 
A. Well, I "\\ras aganist the curb, I walked 
between the curb and the truck. 
Q. And did you pick up a garbage can·J? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Did you get a chance to empty it~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then what did you do~ 
A. When we was debating on which way to 
go, whether we went east or went west. 
Q. You and your partner~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you were standing there talking for 
a minute about that~ 
A. Yes, and some conversation about how 
the truck worked. 
Q. Where was the demonstrator at that 
time, the man demonstrating it~ 
A. He was standing, I think, between I and 
Jimmy. Jimmy was standing on the one side and 
I was standing on the other. 
Q. How long did you say you stood there and 
talked~ 
A. Oh, from three to five minutes." (Plain-
tiff's deposition p. 11). 
"Q. Had you emptied all the garbage for 
that stop~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then what happened~ 
A. Then I turned around to set two garbage 
cans down and someone said the truck was mov-
ing, and that was it. 
Q. And what did you do~ 
A. I just autoinatically took off. 
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Q. Took after the truck~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And tell us then what happened~ 
A. Well, I jumped on the running board 
about the time it hit the curb and then the door 
hit me in the back of the head and knocked me off. 
* * • 
Q. What were you hanging onto~ 
A. The steering wheel. 
Q. Did you ever get a chance to get into the 
seat of the cab? 
A. No. 
Q. Were you trying to reach in to any of 
the controls before you got knocked off~ 
A. That's what I \vas trying to do, to get 
into where I could control the truck. 
Q. But you weren't able to do that~ 
A. I wasn't able to do it." (Emphasis ours.) 
(Plaintiff's deposition, p. 12). 
"Q. And the truck was gaining speed all this 
time~ 
A. It had to be if it was running down hill. 
Q. Well, do you have a n1e1nory of it gaining 
speed~ 
A. Yes." (Plaintiff's deposition, p. 13). 
"Q. NO\\'", before the truck started to roll and 
before you reached the cab, ho\v far had the truck 
rolled~ 
T·HE WITNESS : I don't know. 
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Q. (By Mr. Bayle) Do you have any esti-
mate1 
A. I could guess. 
Q. All right, let's have that. 
A. I'd say from 60 to 80 feet. 
Q. And what were you doing during that 
time? 
A. During the time the truck was rolling? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I was after it. 
Q. And which side were you on~ 
A. On the left side. 
Q. Were you running? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What path did the truck take before it 
reached the curb~ 
A. On an angle straight across the road. 
Q. To the southwest~ 
A. On an angle like this. (Indicating)'' (Em-
phasis ours.) Plaintiff's deposition, PlJ 32-33). 
"Q. And did you see the truck start to roll? 
A. No) I didn)t. 
Q. Which way were you looking at that 
time~ 
A. I'd dumped the garbage can aud turned 
around facing away from the back end of that 
truck and put the two garbage can::; down and just 
about got turned around when so1neone says, '·The 
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truck's moving.'" (Emphasi~ ours.) (Plaintiff's 
deposition, p. 34). 
"Q. And do I understand that your only con-
cern about securing the truck is to set the brakes? 
A. Make sure it's set. 
Q. That's the only precaution you take, is 
that right? 
A. Well, that is the only precaution you take 
that I know of. 
Q. And there aren't any published rules 
about that in your departments, as far as you 
know~ 
A. As far as I know." (Emphasis ours.) 
(Plaintiff's deposition, p. 42). 
"Q. Mr. Thompson, were you running as 
hard as you can run by the time you caught up 
with the truck that day~ 
A. Well, I'd say I was giving it all I had. 
Q. And you think the truck had gone about 
sixty to eighty feet before you could catch it~ 
A. That's just a guess." (Emphasis ours.) 
(Plaintiff's deposition, p. 47). 
The testimony of Jensen \vas in full accord: 
"Q. Did Thompson have to run as fast as he 
could to catch it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was he going full speed when he jumped 
on the truck? 
A. Yes, he \vas pretty well going at it." 
(1£n1phasis ours.) (Jensen's deposition, p. 13). 
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"Q. It happened to be on the east curb, is that 
right~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the wheels were turned to the west? 
A. To the southwest. The truck was actual-
ly facing south and the rear wheels were cramped 
to the southwest so he could make the turn over 
west to pick that other can up on the other side, 
because it's too far to carry the cans from one 
side to the other on that one particular place 
there." (Emphasis ours.) (Jensen's deposition, 
p. 15). 
"Q. If you had been in ~fr. Thompson's posi-
tion there in reference to the truck when it started 
off, would you have run after it~ 
A. Probably would have, yes, just like I did 
the other one. We have always joked and kidded 
and this and that that we would never try to stop 
a truck, but that's just a joke and kid there. 
Q. You have joked and kidded that you'd 
never stop a truck~ 
A. Yes. The way we figure it, if we ever do 
that, we would think more about the other people, 
what the truck is going to do and the damage, and 
a lot of other guys have had the same trouble) but 
they've caught it and stopped it in time to save 
the accident. 
Q. Does this often happen among the other 
drivers? 
A. Oh) once in a while) yes. 
Q. And haven't you had any instruction~ 
about leaving a man in the cab \vhih~ you arP on a 
steep hill? 
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A. Well, that's why we try to get a third 
man on our routes like that on the hills. 
Q. Yes. That morning they didn't have a 
third man becaus~ there wasn't enough to go 
around." (Emphasis ours.) (Jensen's deposition, 
p. 17). 
It was upon the foregoing testimony that 
Judge Faux based his ruling. There was no evi-
dence to the contrary. Plaintiff, of course, is 
bound by his own testimony. 
ARGUMENT 
POIN'T I. 
THI1S IS A PR:OPER CASE FOR A SUMMARY JUDG· 
MENT. 
We have nothing to add to the argument advanced 
under Point I of our brief in Case No. 9807, and we 
merely reaffirm and readopt it as part of this brief. 
POIN'T II. 
PLAINTIFF VIOLATED THE STATUTO·RY STANDARD 
OF ·CARE, AND WAS THEREFORE GUILTY OF CONTRIBU-
·ToRY NEGLIGENCE AS A MA'TTER OF LAW. 
A. PLAINTIF'F VIO,LATED SECTION 41-6-105, U.C.A., 
1953. 
By way of supplement to the argument under Point 
IT of our brief in case No. 9807, we wish to point out the 
following: 
This case resolves itself into a problem of statutory 
eonstruction. 'There is no dispute as to \Yhat occurred. 
:B-,or purposes of the n1otion for summ-ary judgment, 
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plaintiff's testimony is accepted as true. The only issue 
before the court for determination is whether such con-
duct was contributory negligence as a matter of law 
under the aforesaid statute. 
It is elementary that a "statute is not open to con-
struction as a matter of course. It is open to construc-
tion only where the language used in the statute requires 
interpretation, that is, where the statute is ambiguous, 
or will bear two or more constructions, or is of such 
doubtful or obscure meaning, that reasonable minds 
might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning." If 
there is no ambiguity "it is the established policy of 
the courts to regard the statute as meaning what it 
says, and to avoid giving it any other construction than 
that which its words demand. A plain and unambiguous 
statute is to be applied and not interpreted, since such 
a statute speaks for itself, and any attempt to 1nake it 
clearer is a vain labor and tends only to obscurity." 50 
Am. Jur., Statutes, ~225. 
The language of Section 41-6-105, U.C.A. 19'53, is 
clear, and, except for one phrase, hardly open to con-
struction. Under the facts of this case, there can be no 
doubt that plaintiff was a "person driving or in charge 
of a motor vehicle." There is no doubt that he left the 
driver's seat, and got out of the vehicle and went to the 
rear thereof, for the purpose of loading so1ne garbage. 
There is no doubt that he did this "without first stop-
ping the engine, locking the ignition, and re1noving the 
key." ·There is no doubt that the truck was "standing 
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upon" a "perceptible grade," and there is no doubt 
that the front wheels thereof, were not turned to the curb 
or side of the highway, but on the contrary were turned 
away from the curb. For the purpose of this motion, 
it may be assumed that the parking brake was effec-
tively set and that it failed, permitting the truck to go 
down hill. The only phrase which appears to be open 
to construction, and the meaning of which must be 
ultimately determined by this court, is the phrase "stand 
unattended." ·There can be no doubt that effect must 
be given to these words, and they must be given "a 
consistent reasonable meaning." Robinson v. U.P.R.R. 
Co., 70 Ut. 441, 261 P.9; Board of Ed. v. Bryner, 57 
Ut. 78, 192 P. 6.27. 
The cardinal question in statutory construction, is 
determining the legislative will or intent. Once the legis-
lative intention has been determined, it should be car-
ried into effect to the fullest degree. 50 Am. J ur., Stat-
utes, ~223; Sec. 68-3-2, U.C.A. 1953. 
As said by this court in the c~se of Price v. Tuttle, 
70 U. 156, 258 P. 1016 : 
"In the construction of statutes it is the duty 
of the courts to ascertain the intent of the legis-
lative body and, if the legislation is within the 
constitutional power of the Legislature, to enforce 
that intent. In determining the intent of legisla-
tion, not only the language of the act may be 
considered, but the purpose or objects sought by 
the legislature should be and are considered by 
the courts in determining the Legislative intent." 
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The purpose for \vhich a statute is enacted, is of 
pri1nary importance in determining the legislative intent. 
In the construction of a doubtful statute it is proper to 
take into consideration its purpose or object, the par-
ticular evils at which the legislation is aimed, or the 
1nischief sought to be avoided. 50 An1. J ur., Statutes, 
§§303 and 305. 
Sec. 41-6-105, U.C.A., 1953, is part of our Motor 
\-.-ehicle Act. It is taken from the Uniform Act Regu-
lating Traffic on Highways. The obvious purpose of 
this act is to protect the public safety. As said in 
Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 Ill. A pp. 359, 77 N .E. 2d 537 : 
"Our statute in relation to the regulation of 
traffic is entitled ... a 'Uniform Act Regulating 
'Traffic on Highways.' ... It is a comprehensive 
act of which the quoted portion ... is a part. A 
reading of the entire act leads to but one con-
clusion. It is designed in the main to protect the 
public safety." (Emphasis ours.) 
To the san1e effect see Ross v. Hartmn, 139 F. 2d 14. 
The same principle was specifically recognized by 
this court in treating a different section of the same 
statute in North v. c·artwright, 119· Ut. 516, 229 P. 2d 
871. See also 7 Am. Jur., 2d 795, Auton1obil<~ and High-
way Traffic, §234 : 
"A number of states have enacted statutes 
prohibiting motorists frorn leaving a rnotor ve-
hicle unattended without first stopping thP engine, 
locking the ignition, and rernoving the kPy. Th<' 
purpose of such a staute is twofold; it is a < l('t (' r-
rent to theft, and is also a safety device, for to 
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lock the ignition and reinove the key results in 
preventing interference with the vehicle's sta-
tionary condition and Inechanical immobility." 
It is, of course, entirely proper to refer to the ap-
pelate decisions of other courts where a question of 
statutory construction if of novel impression in the 
forum, as in this case. "Indeed it is highly desirable 
that a statute be given a similar interpretation by the 
courts of the several states wherein it is in force." 50 
Am. J ur. 315, Statutes, ~323. That canon of construction 
has been dignified by codification. Sec. 41-6-174 U.C.A. 
1953, provides as follows : 
"!This act shall be so interpreted and con-
strued as to effectuate its general purpose to 
make uniform the law of those states which enact 
it." (Emphasis ours.) 
Statutes identical to, or closely similar to the Utah 
Statutes have not been construed by many appellate 
courts. However, the few which have had occasion to 
interpret the meaning of this language, have made the 
interpretation which we urge in this case, namely, that 
to "stand unattended" means in effect, that there is no 
properly qualified person sufficiently close to, or hav-
ing effective control of, the vehicle as to be able to 
prevent it from escaping, either through mechanical 
failure or through the interference of third persons. 
See Hochschild, Kohn & Co., Inc. v. Candles, (Md.), 6,6 
A. 2d 700, and other cases cited under Point II A of our 
brief in case No. 9807. 
All of the rules and canons of construction point 
the sa1ne 'vay. They all indicate that the legislative 
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intent was to protect the public fron1 runaway vehicles. 
The accident which occurred here, is of the very type 
which the statute "\vas enacted to prevent. Other courts 
which have had occasion to pass on similar legislation 
have so concluded. No sound reason has been advanced 
·why this court should rule differently. 
B. VIOILATION OF SECTIOIN 41-6-105, U.C.A. 1953, IS 
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
We wish to amplify our argument under P'oint II 
B of our brief in Case No. 9807. Having established that 
the conduct of the plaintiff was violative of the statute, 
the only question which remains is whether the violation 
of the statute was negligence per se. This court has 
ruled in an unbroken line of authority that the violation 
of an ordinance or statute designed for the safety of 
life, limb and property, constitutes negligence per se. 
In Smith v. Mine & Smelter Supply Co., 32 Utah 21, 
88 P. 683, this court said : 
"When a standard of duty or care is fixed 
by law or ordinance, and such law or ordinance 
has reference to the safety of life, li1nb, or prop-
erty, then, as a matter of necessity, a violation 
of such law or ordinance constitutes negligence. 
***Care and prudence alone cannot e:rcuse. Ex-
ceeding or disregarding the standard of care 
imposed must be held to be negligence, if it is 
anything.'' (Emphasis ours.) 
That doctrine was reaffir1ned in Skerl v. Willow 
Creek Coal c·o., 92 Utah 474, 69 P.2d 502 .. 
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That the doctrine applies to violation of statutes 
and ordinances designed for the control of motor ve-
hicle traffic was clearly established by North v. Cart-
wright, 119 Utah 516, 229 P.2d 871, where this court said: 
"The statutes were promulgated for the 
protection of the public and to safeguard prop~ 
erty, life and limb of persons using the highways 
from accidents of the type here involved. Viola-
tion of these statutes then, constitutes negligence 
in law. This doctrine of the law has been stead-
fastly adhered to by this court and generally in 
other courts throughout the United States.*** 
"Plaintiff's violation of the statutory stand-
ard of care here involved, bars recovery if the 
violation was a proximate contributing cause of 
the injury." (Emphasis ours.) 
See also 8 Am. Jur. 2d 393: 
"
1The cramping of the wheels against the 
curb is sometimes required by statute, the vio-
lation of which has been held to be negligence 
per se." 
It is no ansvvrer to say that questions of negligence 
and contributory negligence are generally for jury de-
termination. While this is manifestly true where there 
is a conflict in the evidence, no conflict exists here. 
What occurred is established by the undisputed testi-
mony of the plaintiff himself, by which he is bound. 
There is neither a conflict in evidence to be resolved, 
nor are there different inferences to be drawn from the 
undisputed evidence. Neither is this an area where a 
jury may say what a resaonable pe-rson would have done 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
under the circumstances. ·The legislature has specifically 
prescribed what all persons shall do under the circum-
stances here prevailing. Plaintiff clearly did not con-
form to the legislative standard. His failure to do so, 
under the law of this jurisdiction, (which represents al-
Inost universal law), is negligence as a matter of law, 
barring his recovery in this case. 
C. PLAIN!TIFF'S NEGLIGENCE IN VI'OLATING THE 
STAT'UTO·RY IMPOSED DUTY OF DUE CARE WAS 
A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE AOCIDENT. 
We have nothing to add to our argument under 
Point II c·, and simply reaffirm and readopt the argu-
ments set forth under Point II C of our original brief. 
CO·NCL USION 
The applicable Utah statute determines the stand-
ard of care to which plaintiff was required to adhere 
in this case. By his own unequivocal admissions, he 
failed to conform to the legislative mandate in several 
different particulars. As a natural and proximate result 
thereof, he was involved in an accident causing his 
injury. 'The trial court correctly concluded that he was 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, 
and it follows that the judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C'HRISTENSEN AND JE:N~SEN 
By RAY R. CHRIS;TE.N·SEN 
Attorneys for defendant 
1205 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake ·City, Utah 
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